First a little on terminology. Every industry has their own
"insider terminology" that only the people in the particular field
use and understand. Computers and computer security is no different, to
understand some computer security terms a few "insider terms" needs
clarification. Merriam-Webster defines a hacker in the two senses that
are in popular use today: the original and classical usage - "an
expert at programming and solving problems with a computer"; and the more
modern application - "a person who illegally gains access to and
sometimes tampers with information in a computer system". Most
computer experts use the word in it's original sense, a hacker is a person who
is an expert at solving computer problems. The media has propagated the
second definition, and most non-technical people keep that usage in
circulation. Although the term "hacker" may not be used much
on this site, the preferred term is "attacker", out of respect for
all the real hackers that are out there doing good in the world. A note
of interest, another definition in the same Merriam-Webster dictionary for the
word "hacker" is "one who is unskilled or inexperienced".
As an anomaly of techno-lingo, the term "hack" is used to indicate a
poor job or a clumsy, if not failing, accomplishment, i.e. "His fix was a
real hack" or "His application doesn't work, he just hacked it
together."
One last comment on media perception. Any movie or TV show that have
"hackers" breaking into computer systems are not realistic.
They are good for hyping up the public and making money, but they fail to
deliver a true picture of what an attacker is like, what methods and tools are
used, and how security technology is defeated. Often computer screens
are simple mock applications displaying data or images that have absolutely
nothing to do with the task being portrayed. Most computer security
experts may find the story line interesting, but the display of technology
laughable. But that's Hollywood.
Now on to some useful info. Attackers generally come in three basic
varieties: the script kiddie; the advanced "blackhat"; and the
insider. Each pose different levels and types of risk. Most
organizations need to be prepared to handle all three.
The Script Kiddie
While most script kiddies are neither children nor is their average tool a
literal shell script, the script kiddie is aptly named for their usage of
automated tools and their lack of knowledge and experience.
Motivation. Script kiddies are motivated by social status and
quick accomplishment. They generally don't care if the system they are
attempting to compromise is a corporate system or a home user. They want
one more notch on their belt to show off to their friends, hoping to raise
their social status among their peers. They may try to break into
high-visibility sites for the purpose of placing their computer handle on the
site for the world to see. They may seek such occasion over the home
computer for the purpose of a higher degree of respect within their social
circle.
Tools. As their name denotes they have very little knowledge
and depend heavily on someone else's tool to do all the technical work for
them. Often after compromising a system's security they find themselves
at a loss of what to do with this newly "acquired" resource.
Their first tool used in an attack is a scanner, which is set to check a range
of IP addresses (computers) for a list of services that may be running on
those computers. The scanner "takes inventory" of the
computers and their services, and provides a list of computers that were found
and what services were found running. The script kiddie then takes this
list and downloads a specific tool for a particular service that was found
running. The tool was created by someone who understood the service and
it's vulnerabilities. The kiddie executes the tool to exploit the known
weakness of the service compromising the computer system the service runs on.
Detection. Script kiddies are easily detected. Because
the tools they use are also know by the "white hat" community, the
tools' signatures (network activity that the tool generates when looking for
or taking advantage of a security weakness) can easily be detected and
counteracted. It's actually possible (but not recommended) with a good
detection mechanism in place to effectively block script kiddies from
detecting you services and compromising your systems even though your services
may have known vulnerabilities.
Also, because a script kiddie is looking for peer recognition, they will
usually leave highly-visible signs of their activity for all their peers to
see. This includes defacing a web site or re-routing a web site to their
own server. Such activity is highly detectable, any company that
monitors it's own web site will quickly see such obvious changes.
Because the script kiddie is a novice, he generally won't know how to cover
his trail once he's in a system and won't know how to maintain control over
the system using advanced stealth methods.
Prevention. A good detection mechanism that can block script
kiddies is an obvious initial step. Another excellent
prevention that comes up time and time again in computer security is keeping
the current level of patches and updates on all running systems. As new
vulnerabilities are found and published by "crackers" (those that
actually find and determine how to take advantage of computer
vulnerabilities), they are patched by security professionals who monitor
cracking activity.
The Intermediate
The intermediate is someone who is gaining a deeper knowledge and broader
experience in various methods to attack and compromise computer security, and
is developing reasons other than the ego-centric script kiddie to perform
attacks and compromise computer security. An intermediate will begin to
have a working knowledge of security measures such as IDS (Intrusion Detection
Systems) and firewalls and will be aware of methods that circumvent such
measures.
Motivation. The intermediate has begun developing more serious
relationships that motivate his illegal activity in financial, political, or
other non-egocentric directions. The intermediate is not commonly
accepted as advanced and will show some ego-centric behavior in efforts to
"prove" his skills or technical status. If the intermediate is
rising in the ranks of his peers he may target computer systems that will help
him maintain or progress his status in the group, not the just easy
"notch in the belt" targets of the script kiddies.
Tools. The intermediate has a greater technical understanding
of the process of compromising computer security systems and various computer
services. While the intermediate may use some of the same tools as the
script kiddie, his choices will be more deliberate and focused on exactly what
is needed to bypass certain security measures. He will have already
tried many of the automated attacks and discarded those that didn't work well
or consistently. In this manner he is honed in on what is required to
accomplish his goals. The intermediate's longer term of exposure to
various computer systems will also allow him to "work outside of the
box" when he gets in situations where there isn't a tool to accomplish
what he needs or when he needs to coordinate compromising several
vulnerabilities in order to meet his objective. In such situations the
script kiddie would be lost, here the intermediate begins to surpass the
script kiddie.
Detection. Because the intermediate initially relies on the
same tools as the script kiddie to perform reconnaissance, he will uncover his
presence or at a minimum his target to the same security systems that detect
script kiddies. The intermediate's broader range of experience will make
him more active once he has compromised security. By establishing legal
internal activity and detecting and investigating anything beyond this, an
organization can quickly become aware of when security has been compromised
and the extent of the security breach.
Prevention. A good IDS that responds to reconnaissance
measures is essential in early prevention of security breaches by the
intermediate as well as keeping all systems up-to-date with the latest patches
and updates.
The Advanced Blackhat
The advanced blackhat is someone with a significant amount of experience
and a broad scope of exposure to computer technology.
Motivation. An advanced blackhat is not motivated by status or
prestige. Their motivation is usually for the satisfaction of having
accomplished a difficult and challenging task, for financial gain, or for
political/ideological purposes. Because their motivation is so specific,
their selection of targets is highly focused. Often their target will
have a high degree of importance, unlike the script kiddie who will take any
easy target he thinks he can compromise. Computer security from highly
targeted attacks will be the next focus in securing the economic system of the
world from terrorism and in securing corporations against competition in the
form of corporate espionage.
Tools. Because of the wide range of experience a blackhat has,
his selection of tools will be extensive. While a blackhat may initially
use the same or similar scanners to detect vulnerabilities in his target of
choice, he will often not use the same methods to compromise the security on a
system that the script kiddie used. And once he has compromised a
system, he will quickly cover his tracks by modifying logs and restoring the
system to a condition similar to what it was like before the attack was
initiated. Often a blackhat will set up a backdoor to allow easy access
in the future.
Backdoors and tools to keep a blackhat's presence hidden come in packages
called rootkits. Rootkits get their name from the common functionality
of giving the blackhat "root", or administrative, rights over the
compromised system. Rootkits can also modify the logs and provide
backdoor access to the system. Some rootkits can also modify the system
in such a way that if the system's services were examined they would appear to
be exactly as they were before the attack, even though they had been modified
by the attacker.
Detection. Detecting blackhats is much more difficult than the
script kiddie because the blackhat doesn't intend to be notice and takes pains
to hid his access, the opposite of the sloppy script kiddie who just wants to
boast about his accomplishment.
The blackhat has three areas of detection: (1) Because a blackhat's
early steps of reconnaissance are similar to those of the script kiddie, early
detection comes from the network signature of the tools used; (2) Because a
blackhat's intent is to leverage the compromised system in a coordinated
attack against an organization's computer systems he will often modify the OS
or configuration in significant ways to maintain control of the system, such a
significant change can be detected by tools that check the state of the system
and compare it to the state of the system at some stable point in the past;
(3) Often one system that can be accessed from the outside will not have
enough value to suffice the intent of the intrusion, instead it will be used
to compromise other key systems internally, and such internal activity can be
detected if strict internal access policies are in place, adhered to, and
systems and networks are monitored for compliance.
Prevention. Since a blackhat's initial steps of compromising
security are similar to those of the script kiddie, the same preventive steps
need to be in place to detect and thwart a blackhat's attempt to compromise
the security of a system. Removing all tools and applications not
essential to the function of a system helps handicap a blackhat if he's able
to penetrate the outer ring of security. For example, a web server has
no need of the C compiler, but if an attacker were to gain access to the web
server the C compiler would serve him well in installing backdoor patches into
the OS source or other services' source code and recompiling them with these vulnerabilities
built in. Also, the removal of tools on the system may further prevent
the attacker from additional activity. For example, by not having a ftp
client installed the hacker will have a more difficult time in getting his
backdoor patches and rootkits to the box for installation.
"Fingerprinting" a system (taking a snapshot of pertinent services
and configurations) and regularly comparing past fingerprints agains the
current system's state can give an early warning when an attack is just
underway.
Additionally, by implementing strict internal security policies and
remaining vigilant against infraction of these policies, detecting abnormal
network activity from a system can be the first flag that there is a security
problem and swift action can prevent the attacker from perpetrating other
systems.
The Employee or Affiliate Employee
This category represents the internal threat though it may come in a form
other than the employee or an affiliate company's employee. Often in
computer security so much emphasis is placed on external threats and securing
outward-facing servers that internal systems lay unprotected. While it
may be more permissive, internal security is essential to the overall security
of an organization's computer systems. Employee's have a working
knowledge of the security systems and the available targets within the
organization, something most intruders have to figure out as they go.
Such knowledge makes the employee's plan of attack much more powerful and
successful.
Motive. The internal threat ranges from the revenge-seeking
disgruntled employee who was passed up for promotion to the curious newbe that
wants to see exactly what can be accomplished. For highly political or
highly competitive organizations the target may be politically or financially
motivated.
Detection. In general the reconnaissance we saw in the
external threats isn't necessary in most cases of "inside jobs"
although it may appear in areas where the insider can not otherwise determine
the vulnerabilities of his target systems. Internal IDS and strict usage
rules with mechanisms to detect unusual activity is the best way to detect
internal security breaches.
Prevention. Knowing your employees, granting only those
permissions required for each job function, security audits, and an enforced
policy of no-tolerance are some of the best ways to prevent the internal
compromise of security systems.
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